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Abstract
In this paper we develop a novel method of controlling the demand in a multi-class,
QoS-enabled network, using pricing and resource allocation for income maximisa-
tion. We first present a solution to the problem of calculating the optimal prices
and QoS for a single link using a limiting regime approximation, which reduces
the associated computational burden. A heuristic algorithm is then proposed that
improves the limiting regime solution, achieving better results for links with small
capacity. We further extend this approach to a multi-link network, where a dis-
tributed iterative algorithm is developed based on the solution of the single link
model. Results from small and medium size networks show that, even when the as-
sumptions we used do not hold, our approach yields results very close to the optimal
ones (0.17% to 2.95% difference), which are computed by exhaustively searching in
the decision space. Moreover, the calculation time using the proposed approach is
approximately 1.5 minutes for problems which took more than 240 minutes to solve
using exhaustive search.
Key words: Revenue management, pricing, utility, asymptotic approximation,
resource allocation, quality of service
1 Introduction
In this paper we propose an approach to managing a telecommunication net-
work by controlling the demand for services. In contrast to most existing
approaches, which allow demand to depend either on prices or on quality, we
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examine the case where demand for a particular service depends on both these
characteristics. We use this approach to solve the problem of maximising the
income of a multi-class network provider using pricing and resource allocation.
In the scenario here investigated the network provider is allowed to offer a
limited selection of alternative classes of service to users. Each potential user,
according to his/her price and quality requirements, will select the most ap-
propriate and request a connection. Calls belonging to a specific class of service
have identical characteristics. Our model is similar to the differentiated ser-
vices model [31] in that: i) there is a limited number of classes, ii) packets or
flows of packets of the same class are treated in the same way, and iii) state
information is proportional to the number of classes rather than the number
of flows. In diffserv the classes’ quality of service (QoS) differs in terms of de-
lay, jitter, reliability and other parameters. Using a value similar to effective
bandwidth, our model may be a good approximation of the diffserv model.
The exact mapping of other QoS requirements to bandwidth can be the sub-
ject of further research. We also note that, by making decisions for sets of calls
(classes) rather than individual calls, the number of decisions to be made is
greatly reduced, improving the scalability of our solutions. The tradeoff is that
the decisions are not necessarily optimal for each individual user, since not all
the users belonging to a class are characterised by identical requirements.
We assume that, for a given price, an increase in the resources allocated for
each call of a specific class leads to an increase of the QoS for this class. If
this is the case, the number of potential users willing to subscribe to this class
increases, since more users will find the offered quality acceptable. However,
the extra resources which will now be used by the users which were already
satisfied with the lower quality could have been used for other potential users
which, even after the increase of QoS, are not satisfied with it. The unsatisfied
users do not request connection and hence are lost from the system. For this
reason, a proportion of the resources can be considered not optimally used.
The exact amount of resources which are not optimally used in this sense,
is the difference between the minimum resources needed to satisfy the total
active users, and the actual resources used by them. It could be argued that
these resources improve the utility of the users, and therefore may be consid-
ered optimally used, but from an income maximisation point of view, these
resources do not contribute directly to the income of the network provider.
In this paper we develop methods for minimising the amount of resources not
used optimally, as defined earlier. These methods depend on pricing, since the
willingness to pay is here considered as being related to the quality expected
by a user. Setting different prices for each service is a method for ensuring that
users do not request admission for a service which offers much better QoS than
they need, assuming that users of low requirements are willing to pay a lower
price, and in this way it partially alleviates the problem of misused resources
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mentioned earlier. Therefore, the way price and QoS are determined for each
class greatly affects the efficiency of a network.
We firstly explore the problem of finding optimal prices and qualities for the
case of a single-link, with the aim of maximising the income. We present a
solution which is based on limiting regime approximation and then propose
methods to improve this solution. We then develop a distributed iterative
solution for the problem of a multi-link network, a solution which is based on
the single link solution.
1.1 Related work
Most published research uses pricing to control or regulate one of two things:
either i) the incoming rate of new connection requests or ii) the data rate sent
by existing connections or users. In this paper we use pricing to control the
incoming rate of new connections.
A method considering pricing for multiservice networks is presented in [10].
The QoS of each service is given and guaranteed, and the problem of pricing
is formulated as an expected income optimisation problem. In contrast, in this
paper, we take into account QoS as a decision variable, which affects demand
when determining the optimal prices.
Dynamic pricing policies for network services have also been widely investi-
gated, and there is a great variety of propositions. Agent based [11], time-
of-day [6], usage-based [30], threshold-based [21][7] and congestion depen-
dent pricing [20][12] are some of them. The work of Paschalidis et al [17][18]
on dynamic, congestion dependent pricing suggests that static (congestion-
independent) pricing is asymptotically optimal, and therefore the benefits
from dynamic pricing may not worth the extra complexity especially for large
networks with many calls. A distributed mechanism for resource allocation,
based on the pricing results of [17][18] is given in [19]. In contrast to the above
approaches, our model allows the provider to make only static decisions.
Regarding static pricing, in the “Paris Metro Pricing” (PMP) scheme [15][22]
two classes of services exist in the network, and each one has its own queue.
Calls of the high class cost more than calls of the low class. In this way, fewer
users request calls of the high class, and each call of the high class can thus
use more resources, therefore receiving higher QoS. The PMP scheme exploits
also the dependence of demand on prices. In this paper we extend the scheme
proposed in PMP, as we also control and guarantee QoS.
Another study based on demand and pricing, is the work of McKie-Mason and
Varian [13], which assumes that users pay a price depending on the congestion
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of the network and the utilisation, which in turn depend on the demand curve
of individual users and the price. In contrast, in the approach presented in this
paper we focus on pricing and QoS for classes of service, rather than individual
users, and in our model pricing is not congestion-dependent.
Resource allocation using auction based pricing is another popular subject of
research [26][27]. Compared to such studies , our approach is different in that
the network provider informs the users about available prices and qualities
and users can decide whether they will request a connection or not.
Other researchers have addressed this problem resorting to a game-theoretic
framework [14][1][29][28]. In such papers the users are considered players who
compete against each other for resources, who adapt their demand (either by
changing their rate or their priority/service class) to prices until an equilibrium
is reached. This approach is not relevant in the scenarios studied in this paper
were the provider sets and guarantees the quality and the price of each class,
and each user just has to evaluate whether a class is satisfactory for him or
not.
In the work presented in [2] and [3], the authors study the performance of
the network under different bandwidth partitioning policies. It is observed via
simulations that the prices and QoS offered have an effect to the income of
a network provider. In [6] the combined problems of provisioning and pricing
are studied. By provisioning the authors mean the procedure by which the
provider purchases bandwidth, which then is divided between two classes.
Time of day pricing is used, and making decisions in different timescales is
evaluated. Provisioning is based on the actual cost of bandwidth which is
assumed to be purchased by the provider. In our work we assume that the
provider owns the resources or has purchased them in advance, and therefore
provisioning is done under the constraint of limited bandwidth.
When addressing the problems of resource allocation and pricing for telecom-
munication networks, our approach brings revenue management ideas from
operations research. Revenue management [4] aims at maximizing income
through the application of tactics that predict customer behaviour and the
optimisation of services availability and price. Revenue management has been
successfully applied in industries like hotels or airlines, and it has been sug-
gested that it can be applied in computer networks too [8]. We advocate that
the service quality (QoS) is also a parameter which has to be considered in
the case of telecommunication services.
The operation of a network provider is a complex affair where several targets
have to be met simultaneously. In our work we concentrate on the target of in-
come maximisation, which, due to the fact that the marginal costs of a network
provider are minimal, can be translated to profit maximisation. Any telecom-
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munications business will need to assess their income as part of their operations
viability and hence we investigate this aspect here. Other targets, which have
been suggested in the research community are: i) Welfare maximisation:
∑
ui
(The sum of all utilities of all users), and ii) Fairness: maxminui([25]). We note
that the target of welfare maximisation can be achieved within the framework
presented in this paper, where instead of price we consider the utility of the
user.
The underlying aim of this paper is to develop a suitable framework to man-
age the offering of classes of service (CoS) assuming that the demand for a
particular CoS depends on prices and QoS. We propose a framework for the
calculation of the optimal static decisions regarding prices and QoS.
In Section 2 we describe how demand is modelled and its dependency to prices
and quality. Then, the solution of the optimisation problem for a single link is
presented in Section 3. Two solutions are developed; one based on a limiting
regime approximation, and one based on a heuristic, that improves the limiting
regime solution in the cases where the scale of the problem is small. Section 4
analyses the extension of the solution to a network of many links, developing a
distributed solution. The paper ends with our conclusions and further research
directions.
2 Demand model with respect to price and quality
Consider a provider offering services belonging to several CoS. Each class
represents a different service category in resource allocation. Calls belonging
to the same class are allocated the same amount of resources, and therefore
experience the same QoS. We assume that each call of the i’th CoS incurs a
one-off charge of pi. The QoS of each class i is statically set and advertised.
Let qi be a fixed QoS index for the i’th CoS, indicating the QoS that a call of
the i’th CoS receives.
Users interested in making a call arrive according to a Poisson process with
mean rate λ0. In order to model the satisfaction of a potential user from the
price and the quality of a call, we have used utility functions. We choose a
function which includes explicitly the price element, i.e. a highly priced service
has a lower utility than a low priced service of the same quality. As in [24], a
user’s behaviour is modelled by the following utility function:
Ui (p, q, γ) = [γ(p− pi) + (1− γ)qi] θ(p− pi)θ(qi − q) (1)
where Ui (p, q, γ) is the user utility with respect to the i’th CoS, and pi and qi
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Fig. 1. How bandwidth affects quality for a user with minimum requirement q.
are the price and QoS for the i’th CoS, respectively. In this equation, p is the
maximum price a user is willing to pay and q is the minimum QoS the user
can tolerate, respectively. We assume that q = ηp (η constant) to reflect the
fact that users who demand better quality are willing to pay more. We assume
that p ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ [0, η]. Without loss of generality we can assume that η = 1
(scaling the maximum value of q to be 1). Then we can say about the price and
the quality requirements of a specific user that p = q, taking into account that
there is an implicit parameter η = 1[bandwidth unit]/[price unit] which will
be omitted in the rest of the paper. We can therefore use a single parameter r
signifying both the price and the quality requirement. The step function θ(x)
is 0 for x < 0 and 1 for x > 0. It is also assumed that γ is a weight that
quantifies users’ relative sensitivity to service price and service quality.
The utility function as presented in our paper is an approximation of other
well known and used utility functions. Many QoS sensitive users have linear
or sigmoid utility functions [32][33]. Our model captures a common character-
istic of most utility functions, i.e. the fact that utility increases as bandwidth
increases or as price decreases. Due to the assumption of a minimum accepted
quality for each user, our actual utility function is zero up to that point, then
suddenly increasing to a value (equal to q), and then linearly increasing, mim-
icking a sigmoid function. If the minimum requirement is relatively low, the
function looks more like plain linearly increasing, and the sigmoid factor does
not play an important part. In general therefore, two of the most important
families of utility curves that are well known (sigmoid & linear) are captured
with our model (see Fig. 1). Note that the sudden increase in utility which is
characteristic of the step function is also a part of our utility function.
Current research efforts focus on the more accurate mapping of the amount
of available network resources to the perceived utility, see e.g. [36]. As more
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research becomes available on the issue more elaborate and accurate schemes
can be employed. However, our utility function, since it captures the important
characteristics of many utility functions, offers a good first approach.
The requirements of users p, q and the distribution of the users with respect to
p, q play a very important role, since it is via this distribution that the variables
of price and quality for a class affect the actual demand. In this paper, this
distribution is assumed to be uniform, unless stated otherwise. The use of
uniform distribution is essential for the discovery of tractable solutions. It is
possible to find solutions for other cases but only numerically. In Section 3.4
we present simulation results which show that the uniform distribution is a
good approximation to other distributions.
With respect to the call durations we assume that they are governed by an
exponential distribution with mean service rate μi for the i’th CoS. The relax-
ation of this assumption, using for example a phase-type distribution, would
generalise call duration, at the expense of increased complexity, and can be
the subject of further work. In the remainder of the paper we use that μi = 1
for all i. The underlying assumption is that the duration of a connection is
independent of the QoS it will receive. Note that we can relax this assumption.
In this case our algorithms need only minor modifications (see [35]).
A potential customer chooses to request connection for a specific CoS if his/her
utility for this CoS is positive. In the event that a user’s utility is greater than
zero for more than one classes of service the user chooses the one with the
highest utility.
Using the distribution of the potential customers with respect to their de-
mands and maximum tolerated price we can calculate the mean arrival rate
of potential customers for each class λk for each pk and qk. Denote by λab the
mean arrival rate of users with requirements r such that a > r > b. If λ0 is the
total mean arrival rate of potential users and fr(r) their probability density
function with respect to their requirements r, then
λab = λ0
∫ a
b
fr(r)dr (2)
The value of λab is equal to the shaded area in Fig. 2. Note that λab is also
the mean arrival rate for a class with QoS a and price b, when users with
requirements from b to a can only be satisfied by this class. Assume a user
with requirement r(= p = q). If a class k has a quality qk = a such that a > r
then the minimum quality requirement is met for this user. Similarly, if the
price of a class is pk = b such that r > b then the requirement regarding price
is met. Therefore, a class with price and quality such that a > r or r > b will
represent positive utility for the user with requirement r, and hence only users
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Fig. 2. Arrival rate of users with requirements between b and a.
with requirements b < r < a will request admission for this class. For example,
assume a user with requirement 0.8. This means that only classes for which
the price is lower than 0.8 and the quality is larger than 0.8 will represent
positive utility for the user. The values of pk and qk are the two main variables
which determine the arrival rate for class k. If the prices and qualities of two
classes are such that some users might be satisfied by both of them we will
refer to these classes as “overlapping”. In this case the arrival rates for each of
the overlapping classes may also depend on the price and quality of the other
class, since they are competing for the same users.
We implicitly assume the existence of another class of service (best effort),
which caters for elastic traffic. This traffic exists with the lowest priority in
our network, and we can consider only the QoS traffic in our analysis. A
potential issue rising from this is best effort starvation, which is a fairness
problem studied by [25]. A way of dealing with this issue is reserving some
resources for best effort traffic.
The following parameters are considered known to the provider: λ0 (total mean
arrival rate), μi (mean call duration), the distribution of users with respect to
their requirements and the capacity of the link/network. The change in those
parameters (not the variance due to the stochastic nature of the problem)
happens much more slowly than the algorithms presented can be executed.
In addition to that, probably the most important factor of change is the time
of day, or time of week, which can be studied for a period of time and thus
providing with a good estimation of the expected demand on a specific time.
Finally we note that we analyse the user behaviour under the assumption
that users do not have alternative choices to the ones offered by the provider.
This can be the appropriate model in cases where i) there is a monopoly,
ii) there is a subscription service and users are charged on top for usage,
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iii) a provider targets a specific segment of the market and therefore faces
virtually no competition, or iv) the providers act in cooperation. If multiple
competing network providers exist, there are two options: the first option is to
assume that the other providers do not react to the decisions of the provider
whose income we are trying to maximise. In this case, given the complete
set of services offered by other providers, and the characteristics of the total
demand, the impact of the decisions of one particular provider to the demand
for its services can be calculated. The second option, is that decisions made
by one provider will trigger a reaction from other providers. In this case, a
Pareto equilibrium will be reached, and we assume that the model we present
implies that Pareto optimality has been previously reached between different
providers for our solutions.
3 Optimal prices and qualities for a multi-class link
We first look at the scenario where users require service on a specific link,
and the provider offers K different classes of service, for which the provider
sets explicitly the price and the quality. The capacity of the link is considered
given and a very simple admission control takes place: if there are enough
resources to accommodate a request, the request is accepted, otherwise ad-
mission is denied. In this case we consider the quality qi of class i, to be equal
to the bandwidth ri for each call of class i. Denote q = (q1, q2, . . . , qK) and
r = (r1, r2, . . . , rK). The network provider can provide the specific level of
resources to each call (or a good approximation) using a scheduling discipline
like weighted fair queueing (WFQ) where the weights are set depending on
the number of active calls of each class and the set quality for each class. Any
requested connection is accepted with the condition that if it is accepted, the
required resources for this connection do not exceed the capacity of the link.
We further assume in our model that users who request admission for a class
and are rejected (blocked) do not ask admission for another class, hence the
expected income per time unit is
I(p,q) =
K∑
k=1
λk(p,q)(1− Bk)pk (3)
In this equation K is the number of classes Bk(= Bk(p,q)) the request block-
ing probability for class k, λk(p,q)
1 the mean request arrival rate for class k,
and pk the price for class k. Note that there is no closed form solution for the
1 Note that we will use the notations λk(p,q) and λk interchangeably, depending
on whether the dependence of λk on the values of prices and qualities needs to be
emphasized.
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values of prices p and qualities q which maximise the above value due to the
nature of Bk.
A call is admitted if the system remains in a state which belongs to the set
of feasible states S. A state n = (n1, ..., nK), where ni denotes the number
of active calls of class i, belongs to S if
K∑
k=1
nkrk ≤ W , where W is the total
bandwidth of the link. The steady state distribution of the state of the network
is given by a product-form solution [23]:
π(n) =
1
G(S)
k∏
i=1
ρnii
ni!
, ρi =
λi
μi
(4)
where G(S) is defined as
G(S) =
∑
n∈S
K∏
i=1
ρnii
ni!
(5)
If Sk is the set of states for which a call of class k is admitted, then the block-
ing probability for class k is Bk = 1− G(Sk)G(S) . In the book of Ross [23] a recur-
sive algorithm for the calculation of blocking probabilities for the stochastic
Knapsack is presented. We use this algorithm for the calculation of blocking
probabilities where necessary.
3.1 Characteristics of the problem
In this section we study the effect of prices and qualities on income. We limit
ourselves to the case of two classes for illustration purposes. We also assume
that the users are uniformly distributed with respect to their requirements for
minimum quality and maximum price. For these assumptions, according to (2)
requests for calls of a class i with price pi and quality qi will arrive according
to a Poisson process with mean rate λi
λi = λ0(qi − pi) (6)
That is to say that the demand for calls of a specific class of service is linearly
dependent on the price and the quality of this service. This formula is valid
only for the case when class i does not overlap with other classes. If this was not
the case, then a part of the users who arrive with the above mean incoming
rate would request services for the overlapping class. The exact proportion
depends on the users’ sensitivity γ in (1).
10
Fig. 3. Income with respect to prices
3.1.1 Behaviour with respect to prices for constant qualities
We now offer some perspective on the problem we are trying to solve and how
prices and QoS of classes affect the providers income. As can be seen in Fig.
3, the income is concave with respect to the prices 2 , and this observation
will become apparent in the limiting regime case which is presented later in
this paper. This concavity with respect to the prices could be exploited for a
numerical calculation of optimal prices when the values of qualities are given.
3.1.2 Behaviour with respect to qualities for constant prices
The behaviour of I(q) with respect to q is not smooth, as illustrated in Fig.
4, since there are many points where it is discontinuous. Any discontinuity of
I(q) is a result of a discontinuity in the functions Bk since λk is continuous.
We observe that q affects Bk in two ways: through λ and through S, the set
of feasible states. As λ is continuous, any discontinuity is a result of a change
in S. Note that changes in q, and therefore, changes in r may change the set
S, changing the blocking probabilities. The set S will change with r for the
values of r for which there exist n such that
K∑
k=1
nkrk = W . In this case, with
2 For some values of prices and qualities the income might not be concave, but this
only happens in specific circumstances. In particular this may happen if the price
of a lower class is very close to its quality, in which case the low demand for this
class may cause a relatively high increase in the blocking rates of a higher class,
thus leading to a convex increase in income as the price of this low class increases.
11
Fig. 4. Income with respect to qualities
Fig. 5. Discontinuity lines. The thick lines define the surface which represents the
set of allowable values for q1, q2.
any increase of rk by δ for some k, for the same state n, we have
K∑
k=1
nkr
′
k > W,
where r′k = rk or r
′
k = rk+δ, and therefore n /∈ S. For example, in a single class
link withW = 4 increasing the quality from 0.49 to 0.50 (for which no n exists
such that 0.49n = 4) will not alter the feasible states set, whereas an increase
from 0.50 to 0.51 (for which n = 8 satisfies the equation 0.50n = 4) will make
the state with 8 active calls non-feasible. Therefore any points of discontinuity
should be searched on the family of curves given by the equations:
K∑
k=1
nkrk = W (7)
for all the possible values of n. The resulting graph of the lines on which g
is discontinuous is shown on Fig. 5. The discontinuity lines separate the area
of the possible q1 and q2 values into small sections where the function I is
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continuous. Although it is possible based on the above discussion to devise
a numerical method for obtaining the optimal values of prices and qualities,
as the number of classes increases the method becomes intractable. To over-
come this, we have developed an approximation, based on the limiting regime
approximation [9].
3.2 Limiting regime (LR) approximation
A case of special interest is when the capacity of the link is very high, and
therefore a large number of calls can be accommodated. In particular if we
begin with a system with mean arrival rate λ0 and capacity W and we scale
the system by a parameter c, i.e. considering the system with mean arrival rate
cλ0 and capacity cW , then as c → ∞ the system has certain characteristics,
one of which is that if the offered load is not more than the capacity of the
link the blocking probability is zero. Otherwise, the blocking probability is
such that the served load is equal to the available capacity [9]:
B = 1−W/λ0
In such a system the optimal solution with respect to income is a system with
blocking probability zero. If the blocking probability for a class is not zero,
then by increasing its price we can decrease the offered load until it is equal to
the capacity. In this way the carried load is exactly the same as in the previous
case and the income is higher due to the increased prices.
Taking this into account, the problem of finding the values of p and q which
maximise the income in the LR is:
max
p,q
K∑
k=1
λk(p,q)pk (8)
subject to:
K∑
k=1
λk(p,q)qk ≤ W
whereW is the total bandwidth and rk the resources provided for a call of class
k. For completeness, we summarize next some useful observations regarding
the LR solution [35].
a) It is optimal not to have overlapping classes.
Suppose that we have two classes i, j with prices pi, pj and QoS qi, qj respec-
tively. Suppose that i is the highest class of the two (meaning it has higher
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quality and price). If qj > pi (i.e. the quality of the lower class is higher than
the price of the higher class) then the users with requirements r such that
qj > r > pi is satisfied by both classes. If the proportion of the users whose
requirements can be covered by both classes and select class i is ζ, then users
who are satisfied only by the class i arrive with mean rate λqiqj , users who are
satisfied only by class j arrive with mean rate of λpipj , users who are satis-
fied by both classes and choose i arrive with mean rate ζλqjpi and users who
are satisfied by both classes and choose j arrive with mean rate (1 − ζ)λqjpi .
Therefore the income I and the occupied bandwidth W by those two classes
are given by the following equations:
I =λqiqjpi + ζλqjpipi + (1− ζ)λqjpipj + λpipjpj
W =λqiqjqi + ζλqjpiqi + (1− ζ)λqjpiqj + λpipjqj
Let σ be the value for which λqjσ = ζλqjpi . From the definition of σ, note
that qj ≥ σ ≥ pi. It can be easily shown that if we set a new price for class
i, p′i = σ and a new quality for class j, q
′
j = σ the new resulting income I
′ is
higher than I and the occupied bandwidth W ′ is lower than W , therefore the
new solution is better than the previous one. Hence, setting the prices and
qualities in a way that more than one classes may be satisfying for some users
is not optimal.
b) If r2fr(r) is strictly increasing, the quality of each class should the
highest possible, i.e. equal to the price of the immediately higher
class.
Consider the problem of finding what the optimal price and quality is for a
given amount of bandwidth for a class. If the quality for the class is q0 and
the price p0 and assuming that every user can only be satisfied by one class,
the income I is:
I = p0λ0
∫ q0
p0
fr(r)dr (9)
Suppose that qm is the maximum quality that the class in question can get
(either because this qm is the highest quality we can offer in our network, or
because setting the quality higher than qm for this class creates overlapping
classes). Then, using qm we can find a solution where the income obtained is
higher, without using more bandwidth [35]. Let pm be the price for which the
following condition is achieved:
qmλ0
∫ qm
pm
fr(r)dr = q0λ0
∫ q0
p0
fr(r)dr(= W ) (10)
The income in this case is:
I ′ = pmλ0
∫ qm
pm
fr(r)dr (11)
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For r2fr(r) strictly increasing, it can be easily proven that I
′ > I, provided
that fr(r) is continuous, positive and bounded [35]. Note that the condition
that r2fr(r) is strictly increasing includes the case of uniform distribution, for
which fr(r) =constant.
c) Optimal prices and qualities
For a uniform distribution of users with respect to their requirements (fr(r) =
1, r ∈ [0, 1]), the difference between the optimal quality of a class and the
optimal price of the same class should be the same for all classes (for a proof
see [35]), i.e.
qk − pk = α, ∀k ∈ K (12)
where α ∈ < is constant.
3.3 Limiting regime solution
The optimal quality and price for the k’th class is [35]:
qk = 1− (k − 1)α (13)
pk = 1− kα (14)
There are two cases for α, depending on whether the capacity constraint is
violated by the solution for infinite resources or not.
Case a) The capacity constraint is not violated. Then:
α =
1
K + 1
(15)
Case b) The capacity constraint is violated. Then:
α =

W
λ0
, if K = 1
λ0K−
√
λ20K
2−2λ0K(K−1)W
λ0K(K−1) , if K ≥ 2
(16)
The capacity constraint is violated if:
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λ0
(K2 + 3K)
2(K + 1)2
< W
To get an indication of how the number of classes affects the income we observe
that for the unconstrained case (low load) the income is λ0K
2(K+1)
, therefore for
a larger number of classes the income is improved, asymptotically reaching
λ0/2.
3.4 Improved Limiting Regime approximation
We note that the LR presented in Section 3.2 always underestimates the block-
ing probability, hence it overestimates the carried traffic for a given level of
prices and qualities. In addition to this, according to the LR approach, in-
creasing the offered traffic above the level which can be carried by the link
does not result in an increase of the carried traffic. The carried traffic is always
such that the utilisation is 100% and the exceeding demand is blocked. A more
realistic assumption is, however, that the carried traffic never reaches 100%
of the capacity (only asymptotically) and an increase in the offered traffic
leads to an increase in the carried traffic. Hence, in this section we propose an
improved solution to the problem of setting price and quality optimally.
The above observations suggest that the LR approach yields solutions where
the offered traffic is less than the optimal. Therefore, in order to increase the
income in this section we modify the LR solution in a way that increases the
overall offered traffic. This can be done either by increasing the quality level of
one or more classes and/or by lowering their price. In the LR solution, however,
the quality of each class is equal with the price of its immediately higher class
(due to observation b in Section 3.2). Therefore an increase in its quality can
only transfer some of the demand from one class to another. For the LR we
have shown that such a transfer is not beneficial (due to observation a in
Section 3.2). Similarly, decreasing the price of any class, except of the lowest,
does not increase the total number of users who request admission, because
the extra users which now have positive utility for this class already had
positive utility for the immediately lower class and would request admission
to the network even without the change. Therefore the only way to increase
the users requesting admission by changing a parameter (quality or price for
a class), is by lowering the price of the lowest class. This is, therefore, the
first part of the modified algorithm, after the calculation of the optimal LR
solution. We calculate the blocking probabilities for each class and the partial
derivatives of the blocking probabilities with respect to the price of the lowest
class (for the prices and qualities that resulted from the LR solution) and use
a linear approximation model for the blocking probabilities based upon which
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we conduct an iterative optimisation procedure. The problem to be solved is
max
pK
I(p,q) = max
pK
K∑
k=1
λk(p,q)(1− Bk)pk (17)
where the values of the blocking probabilities for each class i are linearly
approximated by
Bi = B
∗
i +
∂Bi
∂pK
(pK − p∗K) (18)
In the above equation p∗K is the solution using the LR approximation (see Sec.
3.2) and B∗i and
∂Bi
∂pK
are calculated using the values for prices and QoS that
result from the LR approximation. B∗i is calculated using the product-form
formula or the recursive algorithm of Ross [23]. ∂Bi
∂pK
is calculated numerically,
using the definition of derivatives. The index K refers to the lowest class. The
function to be maximised is a 3rd degree polynomial (irrespective of the total
number of classes) and can easily be maximised by setting the first derivative
of I with respect to qK equal to zero. Once an iteration is over we substitute p
∗
K
with the value for pK which results from the above optimisation, calculate B
∗
i
and ∂Bi
∂pK
for the new value and perform the maximisation of the new resulting
function. In this way we find the price of the lowest class which maximises the
income.
Taking into account the characteristics of the optimal solution of the limiting
regime approach we can make further adjustments to all prices and qualities
(except the quality of the first class which remains at the maximum and the
price of the lowest class which remains at the value calculated in the first
step of this algorithm) so that the quality of each class is equal to the price
of its immediately higher class, taking into account observation c in Section
3.2) from the LR solution. In this way a further improvement of the results is
achieved. The above sequence of actions can be summarisedas follows:
Algorithm 1
(1) Calculate the LR solution (15) or (16).
(2) Solve (17), assuming that Bi is a linear function of pK (18). Repeat this
step until |pnK − pn−1K | < , where  a small positive real and pnK the
resulting pK of iteration n.
(3) For the resulting value of pK , correct prices and quality of all classes
according to observation c) of Section 3.2, i.e. for k = 1, ..., K set qk =
1− (k − 1)α′ and pk = 1− kα′, where α′ = (q1 − pK)/(K − 1).
(4) End.
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The above algorithm achieves results within 1-2% of the optimum (Fig. 6)
for all values tested, for a fraction of the computational time compared to
an exhaustive search algorithm. The method we use for the calculation of
blocking probabilities has a complexity of O(CK), where C is the size of the
link and K the number of classes. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is, therefore,
O(CK), since the complexity of the LR solution is O(1). The complexity
of an exhaustive search algorithm is O(CKΞ2K), where Ξ is the number of
different values tested for the price and quality of each class, and it depends
on quantisation. It is worth noting that the heuristic algorithm for a link
with bandwidth 10 took 0.01 seconds to run 3 , whereas the exhaustive search
method for two classes took 5 minutes, (with a quantisation step of the prices
and quality of 0.001), using a fast iterative method for the calculation of
the blocking probabilities[23]. The difference in computational time increases
exponentially as the number of classes increases. Our algorithm has converged
for all tested simulation settings. The formal proof of convergence is the subject
of further research.
In Step (2) of Algorithm 1, an alternative way of calculating the optimal
reduction of pK is using a brute force exploration (exhaustive search) over
pK only. The complexity of this is O(CKΞ). The results for this case are
marginally (< 1%) improved compared to Algorithm 1 and the calculation
time is 0.25 seconds for a link of bandwidth 10.
We observe that as the mean arrival rate of potential customers increases the
improvement of the income is higher. In the case where the offered traffic is
very small (and therefore the blocking probability is low) the modified solu-
tion does not present significant improvement over the original LR solution. In
Fig. 7, for each value of c we assume that the mean incoming rate of potential
users is cλ0 and the capacity cC0. We observe that as the scale of the network
increases, the improvement of the heuristic solution over the LR solution de-
creases. This is expected because the LR is a more accurate approximation
for larger-scale networks. Figure 8 shows the income improvement of the LR
and the heuristic solution compared to the income using the values from the
solution for unlimited resources. Notice that for each case the income reaches
a maximum, which for the case of LR and improved LR solution is equal to the
income when all resources are sold at the maximum price per resource unit,
i.e. the price for each class is very close to its quality. This can happen only
when demand is so high that the prices can be set very high, which is usually
not the case. A repeated occurrence of such a situation may be an indication
that the network infrastructure is insufficient compared to the demand and it
is probably beneficial to expand it, depending of course on the cost of such an
3 All simulations in this paper were conducted using MATLAB (TM) v. 7.0.1.24704
(R14) Service Pack 1 on a Dell (TM) PC with Intel Pentium (TM) 2500MHz pro-
cessor and 512MB RAM, under Windows XP Professional (TM) operating system
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Fig. 6. Income using different methods for calculating an approximation of the
optimal values of prices and qualities.
Fig. 7. Improvement of heuristic over LR as the scale of the network increases.
expansion.
We conducted further tests for non-uniform distribution of the users with
respect to their price and quality requirements. The results are encouraging
with an achieved income of no more than 3% lower than the optimal income for
all cases tested. The distribution functions which were tested are the normal
distribution (Fig. 9) and the exponential distribution (Fig 10). The optimal
solutions on the graphs were obtained using an exhaustive search algorithm,
whereas the heuristic ones have been calculated using Algorithm 1.
The relaxation of the linear relationship of p and q has similar characteristics
to the relaxation of the uniform distribution assumption, since it mainly affects
the linear relationship of the arrival rate for a class with its price and quality
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Fig. 8. Comparison of income using LR and heuristic solution with income using
solution for unlimited bandwidth.
Fig. 9. Comparison of results between heuristic and optimal solutions for normal
distribution of users with respect to their requirements.
(λk = λ0(qk − pk)). To the best of our knowledge this relaxation can only be
solved numerically.
3.5 Remarks on maximisation using LR approximation
As the problem (8) is a case of constrained optimisation, we can approach the
problem using Lagrange multipliers, which can offer us some further insights
in the nature of the problem studied in this paper.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of results between heuristic and optimal solutions for exponen-
tial distribution of users with respect to their requirements.
The function to be maximised is
∑
i λipi and the constraints are:
• The total capacity constraint: ∑i λiqi ≤ W
• The constraint that the price of a call is lower than its quality: pi ≤ qi
• The constraints from observation a) in Section 3.2 that the quality of a
class should not be higher than the price of the immediately better class:
qi ≤ pi−1
• The maximum allowable value of the quality of the first class should be 1
and the lowest value of the price of the last class should be greater or equal
to zero: q1 ≤ 1, pK ≥ 0, thus ensuring that all prices and qualities ∈ [0, 1]
Then the Lagrangian function to be maximised is
L =∑
i
λi(p,q)pi−Λ[
∑
i
λi(p,q)qi−W ]−
∑
i
Φi(pi−qi)−
∑
i
Ψi(qi−pi−1) (19)
The Lagrangian multipliers Λ,Φi,Ψi are either equal to zero, for the case when
the corresponding inequality is not active for the optimal solution, or equal to
the marginal value of relaxing the corresponding inequality, if the inequalities
apply as equalities for the solution.
It can be shown that for any distribution of the users, it is not optimal to
have the price and the quality of a class equal. This can be proven by using a
similar method as we used for observation a) in Section 3.2. (Recall that when
the price and the quality of a class are equal there is no demand for this class.)
Therefore, the Lagrange multipliers regarding this subset of constraints (Φi)
are equal to zero. Therefore, the Lagrangian is:
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L =∑
i
λipi − Λ
∑
i
(λiqi −W )−
∑
i
Ψi(qi − pi−1) (20)
where Λ represents the scarcity (or marginal value) of bandwidth, as classes
compete for it. The values Ψi represent the scarcity of the demand. Note that
from observation a) in Section 3.2 the prices and qualities of the classes should
be such that each potential customer may have at most one class satisfying
him/her. Hence, demand becomes also a scarcity, and classes compete with
each other for it. Each of the above Lagrangian multipliers Ψi represents the
marginal value of demand for each pair of neighbouring classes.
Taking the first derivatives of (20) with respect to pi and qi we obtain:
∂L
∂pi
=
∂I
∂pi
− Λ∂W0
∂pi
+Ψi+1 (21)
∂L
∂qi
=
∂I
∂qi
− Λ∂W0
∂qi
−Ψi (22)
Here W0 =
∑
i λiqi is the expected total occupied bandwidth, and I =
∑
i λipi
is the expected income per time unit. In order to find the optimal solution
to the problem, we need the values in (21),(22) to be equal to zero. We now
focus on what would these equations mean. For the case of (21), it would mean
that the increase in income ( ∂I
∂pi
), plus the decrease in utilised bandwidth
multiplied by the marginal value of bandwidth, plus the marginal value of
demand (referring to users with requirements around the price pi) is equal to
zero. The second and the third terms of this equation are positive, therefore the
first term will be negative. The physical interpretation of this is the following:
the optimal price pi is such that the decrease in income which would result
by further increasing the price would be equal to the value of resources that
would be freed plus the value of demand which would be available for the
immediately lower class.
Similarly, from (22), we can state that the solution regarding qi is such that
the increase in income which would result by increasing the qi would be equal
to the value (or cost) of extra resources that would be now engaged plus
the value of demand which would no longer be available to the immediately
higher class, since increasing the qi would mean increasing pi−1 according to
observation a) in Section 3.2.
The above observation provides further insight into what our approach accom-
plishes using prices and QoS. Apart from the usual aim of allocating resources
to classes, we also allocate demand to each class at the same time.
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4 Network-wide models
Consider a network with a set L of links and a set T of possible call routes.
Potential calls for route R ∈ T arrive according to a Poisson process with mean
rate λ0,R. Each potential user has specific quality and price requirements. If a
specific class of service on route R is satisfying the potential user, the user will
request admission. If enough resources are available on all links, the request
will be accepted, otherwise it will be blocked. Each call belongs to a specific
class, which is the same for all the links it crosses. This means that a call
cannot belong to class i of a link and class j, j 6= i of another link.
In designing a pricing structure for our network, we assume that for each class
k and each link l there is a one-off charge of plk which has to be paid by all
calls of class k which pass from link l [37]. Therefore, the price of a call of
class k on route R, pRk is the sum of the prices paid on each link of route R:
pRk =
∑
l∈R
plk (23)
With this approach, a call is charged for all the resources it is using. We also
consider that the quality index of a call is equal to the data rate. Therefore,
the quality of a call for class k on route R, qRk, is equal to the minimum
quality of the links traversed:
qRk = min
l∈R
qlk (24)
where qlk is the quality of calls of class k on link l. We assume uniform dis-
tribution of users with respect to their price and quality requirements, and
that users are prepared to pay prices proportional to the number of links
of their route, otherwise the provider will have a strong preference for users
whose routes traverse less links, since it will probably be very profitable to
effectively shut out users who require longer routes. Then the demand (mean
arrival rate of users requesting admission) for a class of service on a specific
route will be:
λRk = λ0,R(qRk − pRk/|R|) (25)
where |R| is he number of links on route R. The overall problem to be solved
is the maximisation of the total income on all routes:
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I =
∑
R∈T
K∑
k=1
λRk(1− BRk)pRk (26)
In order to solve the stated network problem, we resort to link independence
approximation [9] which assists in the decomposition of the problem to several
local subproblems, one for each link of the network. This approximation is
more accurate if a link is carrying many calls of low bandwidth. In order
to find the characteristics of each single link problem to be solved, we use
the low blocking approximation [9], where thinning of demand on a link due
to blocking on other links of a route is not taken into account. Therefore,
the blocking probability for class k on route R, BRk, is approximated by
the blocking probability for class k on link l, Blk, when we solve the local
subproblem of link l. Under the low blocking approximation, potential users
for a link arrive according to a Poisson process, with mean rate λ0,l equal to
the sum of the mean rates for each route that passes through that link [5].
λ0,l =
∑
R:l∈R
λ0,R (27)
When solving the problem for each link, the approximation is made that the
proportion of potential users who request admission for routes passing from
this link, depends only on the price and the quality of this link. Hence, we
approximate qRk with qlk and pRk with plk for each route R when doing the
calculations on each link l. The difference between the locally (on link l ∈ R)
estimated mean arrival rate of users for a specific class k of a specific route
R and the real mean arrival rate of users (assuming low blocking and link
independence) is then:
λ0,R(qlk −min
m∈R
qmk − plk +
∑
m∈R
pmk/|R|) (28)
This difference is zero when the quality and the price for class k are the same
on all links. Using the LR approximation analysis of Section 3.2, we observe
that this will be true when the value of α in (16) is the same for all links.
It is easily shown that α will depend only on the fraction λ0l/Wl (potential
call arrival rate/capacity), which we will call relative load of the link. This
means that the decentralised solution will be optimal (under the low blocking
and link independence assumptions) if the relative load on each link on the
network is the same. The more diverge the relative load on the links, the more
the decentralised solution differs from the optimal.
The demand for calls of class k on route R, when calculated for the solution
of the income maximisation problem on link l is approximated by:
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λRk = λ0,R(qlk − plk) (29)
Therefore, using (27), the total demand for calls of class k on link l is:
λlk =
∑
R:l∈R
λ0,R(qlk − plk) = λ0l(qlk − plk) (30)
which is identical to (6), the single link case. Hence, the problem that we solve
on each link l is the maximisation of the income from link l, Il:
Il =
K∑
k=1
λlk(1− Blk)plk (31)
For the solution of each single link problem we employ the methods developed
in Section 3. If we substitute pRk in (26) according to (23), and taking into
account the low blocking approximation [5] (BRk ≈ Blk) when considering
a link l, after rearranging and substituting we get I ≈ ∑l∈L Il, and due to
the low blocking and link independence approximations we assume that by
solving each local maximisation problem, we achieve a good approximation of
the global maximisation, since the local decisions on each link do not greatly
affect the income from other links.
max I ≈∑
l∈L
max Il (32)
The accuracy of this approximation depends on the blocking probabilities
on the network. The lower the blocking probabilities (for example, in a non-
overloaded system in the LR of many small calls), the more accurate the
approximations (29) and (32) and therefore the more accurate the final result.
The decentralised solution of (31) is an approximation of the optimal solu-
tion (26). The three basic parameters which affect the sub-optimality of the
decentralised solution are the blocking probabilities, the difference in relative
load on the links and the relative size of the calls to the size of the links.
Calculating the solutions independently for each link is scalable, as opposed
to a centralised optimal solution which would require to take into account the
prices and quality of all links and routes when estimating the demand.
We further note that, although in cases of low traffic the low-blocking approx-
imation does not cause significant difference from the optimal solution, when
the offered load is very high, a decentralised solution based on the low block-
ing approximation will differ greatly from the optimal. A well known method
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for dealing with the problem of calculating the blocking probabilities on a
network without solving the corresponding system of equations is the Erlang
fixed point iterations [9][23]. Therefore, in order to enhance our algorithm, at
each iteration we assume that the offered load on each link is thinned by the
blocking probabilities on other links. Denote by Erk(λl) the Erlang blocking
probability of a multiple-class link when the mean incoming rate of potential
calls is λl = λ1, ..., λK . In a multiclass network, for the t’th iteration we would
have:
λ
(t)
th,l,k =
∑
R:l∈R
λ0,R
m 6=l∏
m∈R
(1− B(t−1)m,k ) (33)
B
(t)
l,k = Er(λth,l
(t)) (34)
where B
(t)
l,k the estimation of the blocking for class k on link l for iteration t,
and λ
(t)
th,l,k is the estimation of mean incoming rate of potential calls for class
k on link l after taking thinning into account, for iteration t.
It is not trivial to incorporate a fixed point iteration in our algorithm when
multiple classes need to be considered. In Section 3, we do not take into account
demand for different classes independently, but we assume that potential users
arrive with mean rate λ0 and then are distributed to classes according to their
requirements. Although it could be possible to take into account the different
thinning for each class throughout the following algorithm, the complexity
would increase and the simple solution of Section 3 would not apply. For this
reason, we employ the following heuristic/hybrid algorithm:
Algorithm 2
(1) For all l ∈ L, calculate the optimal prices and qualities without taking
thinning into account, using Algorithm 1.
(2) Calculate the resulting blocking probabilities using fixed point iteration,
(33).
(3) For all l ∈ L, define as hl the highest blocking probability among the
classes. Calculate the LR solution (15) or (16) using λh,l = λ0,l(1 − hl)
instead of λ0. Call λh,l,k = λh,l(qlk − plk) the incoming rate for each class
k.
(4) Improve the solution by taking into account the thinning of each class
independently:
qlk = pl(k−1) (35)
plk = qlk − λh,l,k/λth,l,k (36)
(5) Using qlk and plk perform steps (2) and (3) of Algorithm 1, where in (17)
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λk is substituted with λth,l,k(qlk − plk).
(6) Go to step (2) of this algorithm unless for all k and l |q(t)lk − q(t−1)lk | < 1
and |p(t)lk − p(t−1)lk | < 2, for small 1, 2.
In Step (3), we solve the LR problem assuming that the incoming rate has
thinned by the same proportion for all services. For each link we use the highest
thinning among the different classes, which can be locally estimated as the
number of requests that arrived divided by the number of requests expected
to arrive if there where no thinning. Step (4) is based on the observation that
the result from step (3) gives a good indication of the optimal distribution of
demand among classes in the optimal solution. Since the highest thinning has
been used for all of the classes in step (3), the thinning of all classes, except
the one which had the highest thinning, has been overestimated. Beginning
from the class of highest quality according to the LR solution and considering
each class with decreasing order, set the quality qlk of each class to be the
highest possible without overlapping with the immediately higher class (see
Section 3) and set the price plk in such a way that the offered load of this class
remains the same as it was using the solution in step (3). In step (5), (17)
should be written taking into consideration that the offered traffic for each
class is thinned by a different parameter (the blocking probability specific to
each class). This will not increase the complexity (the equation to be solved
remains a 3rd degree polynomial) and will provide more accurate results.
The main advantage of Algorithm 2 is the fact that in each local maximisation
on the links, the decisions on the other links are now taken into account
through the blocking which results in thinning of the load. Note that, for
this improvement, no information needs to be explicitly exchanged between
nodes. The thinning of the demand on each link can be estimated through
measurements, by comparing the theoretical demand (if there was no thinning)
with the actual demand on each link, or by measuring the proportion of calls
which the link accepted but did not actually take place due to blocking from
another link. In such a case the calculation of blocking probabilities using the
fixed point iteration (33) would be substituted by measurement of the blocking
probabilities.
We have conducted simulations for the simplest case of a network consisting
of two links and 3 possible routes, as shown on Fig. 11. The results for several
different cases regarding the values of the capacity of each link (W1,W2) and
the overall demand on each route (λ1,λ2,λ3) are shown on Table I. We can
see that our decentralised algorithm obtains income results very close to the
optimal, with a difference between 0.17% and 2.7%. The worst case of 2.7%
difference, corresponds to heavy blocking (50-60%) and severe link dependence
(since most of the traffic comes from route 3 which crosses both links). At the
same time, for the cases studied, the computational time is reduced from
hours (for exhaustive searching) to 1-2 minutes, the exact computational time
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Fig. 11. A simple multi-link case.
Settings Results
W1 W2 λ1 λ2 λ3 Income using Optimal Difference
calls/s calls/s calls/s solution (31) income (26)
Case 1 6 4 11 11 11 5.69 5.70 0.17%
Case 2 6 4 11 11 21 6.08 6.13 0.82%
Case 3 10 3 11 11 21 6.64 6.71 1.01%
Case 4 3 5 11 5 15 4.23 4.27 0.94%
Case 5 3 5 5 11 15 4.66 4.67 0.26%
Case 6 3 5 2 2 20 3.98 4.10 2.7%
Table 1
Results Comparison for a 2-links network.
depending mainly on the size of the links, which affects the computational
complexity of calculating blocking probabilities (O(CK), where C is the size
of the link and K the number of classes). In particular, the exhaustive search is
O(CKΞ2KL), where Ξ is the number of values tried for each price and quality,
which depends on the quantisation step and L is the total number of links.
Algorithm 2 is O(CKL), since it depends on the number of links L and the
calculation of blocking probabilities which is O(CK) for each link.
Further simulations have been conducted for the four-node network of Fig. 12.
We assume that the potential user mean arrival rate for each of flows 1-4 is
λ1, for flows 5-8 λ2, for flows 9-12 λ3 and for flows 13 and 14 λ4. The capacity
of links A-D is W1 and links E and F have capacity W2. Due to symmetry, the
solutions for links A-D will be identical, as well as the solutions for links E-F,
making the exhaustive search more tractable. The results show that in all cases
the decentralised solution (31) is very close to the optimal (26) as discovered
using exhaustive search algorithm. Note that the total calculation time for
the 6 cases was 4 hours and 16 minutes for the exhaustive search algorithm,
and only 1 minute and 38 seconds for the decentralised hybrid algorithm. The
difference is computational time is expected to be even larger for the case of
more than two CoS’s due to the exponential increase of the size of the decision
space.
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Fig. 12. The square network used for simulations.
Settings Results
W1 W2 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 Income using Optimal Diference
calls/s calls/s calls/s calls/s solution (31) income (26)
Case 1 5 5 5 6 7 3 15.971 16.218 1.52%
Case 2 8 3 4 5 6 4 18.475 19.036 2.95%
Case 3 5 3 10 3 2 5 14.208 14.323 0.80%
Case 4 3 8 4 5 3 5 12.147 12.459 2.50%
Case 5 10 10 4 2 3 1 18.359 18.711 1.88%
Case 6 4 4 3 5 3 3 11.61 11.804 1.64%
Table 2
Results Comparison for 4-node network.
5 Final remarks
In this paper we analysed the problem of resource allocation and pricing,
with the aim of income maximisation. The role of prices in a telecommunica-
tions environment can be twofold. Apart from being the well-known reward
mechanism for the provider of the telecommunications resources, it is also a
mechanism of selection and classification of users according to their utility
requirements. The fact that users who demand higher services are prepared to
pay more, can be used by the provider in any task that requires (or would be
more efficiently performed with) segmentation or categorisation of the users.
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The problem we have addressed in this paper attempts to aid the decisions of
a network provider regarding the quality and the price of calls belonging to
different classes. After analysing the problem and its parameters, an approxi-
mation was presented, for the case when the number of calls of the route is very
large. This approximation simplified all equations to a great extent. We devel-
oped a numerical method for improving the LR solution of [35], which would
be more relevant for access links of smaller capacity. For the case of a network
of many links, under the assumptions of link independence and similar load
across different links, we have found an approximate solution which is within
3% from the optimal for all the cases studied, even when the assumption of
uniform distribution, or the assumption of balanced load does not hold. For
the approximate decentralised solution we use the Erlang fixed point iteration
method. A matter of further research is to compare our algorithm to more
general existing global optimisation methods. Another relevant extension of
our work is to conduct a sensitivity analysis of our solution to the relationship
between q and p.
We are currently considering only static decisions in our model, but dy-
namic/adaptive versions of the algorithms presented in our paper are cur-
rently under investigation, where prices and quality change depending on the
state of the network, and potential users are informed of the offered services
and their prices. In general, although adaptive solutions offer better results
in terms of income, this improvement comes at a cost, since the complexity
of the decisions is increased, and users also face a more complicated system,
where they cannot be sure about the prices in advance. Especially for the
case of dynamic adjustments of prices and quality, preliminary results show
that it is possible to improve the income from a network, but the complexity
of the problem increases significantly. Another direction of research, which is
currently under investigation, is balancing the relative load among alternative
routes using pricing. This would improve the accuracy of our algorithm which,
as we show, partially relies on the assumption that the relative load is similar
on all links.
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